Labor Law - Successorship - Post-Transfer Viability of the Bargaining Unit Forms a Sufficient Basis to Impose a Duty to Bargain upon an Acquiring Employer Even Where the Absence of Any Connection Between the Predecessor and Successor Precludes More Extensive Liability by Cullen, Philip M., III
Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 12 
1972 
Labor Law - Successorship - Post-Transfer Viability of the 
Bargaining Unit Forms a Sufficient Basis to Impose a Duty to 
Bargain upon an Acquiring Employer Even Where the Absence of 
Any Connection Between the Predecessor and Successor 
Precludes More Extensive Liability 
Philip M. Cullen III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip M. Cullen III, Labor Law - Successorship - Post-Transfer Viability of the Bargaining Unit Forms a 
Sufficient Basis to Impose a Duty to Bargain upon an Acquiring Employer Even Where the Absence of Any 
Connection Between the Predecessor and Successor Precludes More Extensive Liability, 18 Vill. L. Rev. 
126 (1972). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW - SUCCESSORSHIP - POsT-TRANSFER VIABILITY OF THE
BARGAINING UNIT FORMS A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO IMPOSE A DUTY
TO BARGAIN UPON AN ACQUIRING EMPLOYER EVEN WHERE THE
ABSENCE OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PREDECESSOR AND
SUCCESSOR PRECLUDES MORE EXTENSIVE LIABILITY.
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. (U.S. 1972)
Burns International Security Services, Inc. (Burns) was awarded a
service contract to provide plant protection for the Lockheed Aircraft
Service Company. These services had formerly been provided by Wacken-
hut Corporation whose employees were represented by the United Plant
Guard Workers of America (UPG). Prior to its being awarded the con-
tract, Burns was aware that the UPG had been recently certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of those employees and had entered
into a three-year collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut about
two months before the latter's service contract expired.' Burns transferred
fifteen of its own employees from other locations and hired 27 of those
formerly employed by Wackenhut at the Lockheed site. As a condition of
employment, Burns required the former Wackenhut employees to join
the American Federation of Guards (AFG) which was subsequently
recognized by Burns on the basis of an authorization card majority. 2
The UPG demanded recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all guards at the Lockheed plant and further demanded that Burns
recognize the collective bargaining agreement previously negotiated with
Wackenhut. Burns refused, and unfair labor practice charges were filed.
The National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") found that Burns
had violated section 8(a) (2)s of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) by improperly assisting the AFG in organizing the employees
and in subsequently recognizing that union.4 The Board also determined
that, since the takeover did not affect a significant change in the operation
at the Lockheed site, Burns was a successor employer and its activities
had violated section 8(a) (5)5 of the NLRA in three respects: (1) by
refusing to recognize and bargain with the UPG; (2) by refusing to
1. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 275 n.1 (1972), aff'g
441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. Id. at 275.
3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
4. 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 348-49 (1970). This ruling was not appealed. 406 U.S.
at 276.
5. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970),
provides that an employer who refuses to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees shall be guilty of an unfair labor practice. The term "to bargain
collectively" is defined in section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) as:[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . ...
The Board also concluded that Burns violated section 8 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)(1970), by interfering with those rights protected in section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
[VOL. 18
1
Cullen: Labor Law - Successorship - Post-Transfer Viability of the Bargai
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
honor the agreement negotiated between the UPG and Wackenhut; and
(3) by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment
without consulting the UPG.6 As a result, Burns was directed to recog-
nize the UPG, to honor the Wackenhut agreement, and to compensate
the employees for losses resulting from these violations. 7
Burns sought review8 of the Board's decision before the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Board cross-petitioned for en-
forcement.9 The court enforced that portion of the Board's order re-
quiring Burns to recognize and bargain with the UPG,10 but relying on
the policy of free collective bargaining enunciated in section 8(d)" of
the NLRA and buttressed by the holding in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 12
it refused to enforce the portion requiring Burns to honor its predecessor's
contract.13 The Supreme Court, in a decision turning "to a great extent
on the precise facts involved,"'1 4 concurred with the reasoning of the
Second Circuit and held that, while the rule barring elections within one
year following a valid Board certification of a bargaining representative 5
was sufficient to give rise to a duty to bargain on the part of the acquiring
employer, the hiring of the predecessor's employees, of itself, formed
"a wholly insufficient basis"' 6 for compelling such an employer to assume
in toto the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Burns
International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Burns represents the most recent attempt of the Court to come to
terms with one of the more complex problems of labor relations - how
to make the necessary accommodation between the conflicting policies
of achieving peaceful labor-management relations and preserving freedom
6. 406 U.S. at 276. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court, in
an opinion by Brennan, J., held unilateral action by an employer with respect to
matters which are subjects of mandatory bargaining to be violative of section 8(a) (5).
7. The Board may order a person committing an unfair labor practice to cease
and desist from that activity and may require that person to take affirmative remedial
action, such as reinstatement with or without back pay. National Labor Relations
Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
8. National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), permits
persons aggrieved by a final board order to seek review in any federal circuit court
within the jurisdiction of which the unfair labor practice occurred or the person
resides or transacts business.
9. National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), provides
that :
Upon . . . filing . . . such petition, the court . . . shall have . . . jurisdiction
, * * to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as
so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board . ...
10. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911, 914-15 (2d
Cir. 1971).
11. Section 8(d) specifically states that the obligation to bargain collectively
"does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
12. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
13. 441 F.2d at 914-15.
14. 406 U.S. at 274.
15. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1970).
16. 406 U.S. at 287.
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of contract.17 The increasing concern with the potentially disastrous
effects which changes in ownership could have on the work force' s has
led to the utilization of the successor doctrine which attempts to insure
that the employees' major safeguard, an established bargaining relation-
ship,19 would survive a business transfer.
The concept of successorship is a derivation from the law of corpora-
tions20 and implies the existence of a "substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise before and after the change" of ownership.2'
Although the determination of the existence of the prerequisite degree
of continuity is made on the basis of "all the circumstances, '22 certain
factors are considered significant. Among these are the substantial con-
tinuity of the same business operations, with the same plant, work force,
and supervisors producing the same product or services in the same
geographic location. 23 An employer, once found to be a successor, must
meet "certain burdens or obligations to which a similarly situated em-
ployer who is not a 'successor' would not be subject. ' 24 These include
the duty to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union, 25 remedy a
17. See, e.g., Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers,
Collective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REv. 413 (1966).
18. This concern was one of the primary factors behind the decision in John
Wiley & Song, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), wherein the Court observed:
Employees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take
part in negotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership. The negotiations
will ordinarily not concern the well being of the employees, whose advantage or
disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be incidental to the main con-
siderations.
Id. at 549. One writer has suggested that the damage may extend much further:
If employees observe contractual law being ignored by the successor, with their
contractual gains dissipated, they are trained that industrial laws may be
disregarded at opportune moments. This, of course, invites industrial lawless-
ness, disrespect for industrial rules, and overall cynicism of the entire collective
bargaining process.
Doppelt, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options - and Raises Some
Problems, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 176, 184-85 (1971).
19. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
20. In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the
corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in existence,
the latter corporation is liable for the debts, contracts, and torts of the former ....
15 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7121 (rev. ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted).
Those Justices voting in the minority in Burns also felt the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 6-101 to -111 (bulk sales), to be apposite. 406 U.S. at 305
(Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). In the labor law context, such an
approach seemingly would provide some protection to employees against a successor
taking over with knowledge of their pre-transfer claims.
21. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
22. Northwest Galvanizing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 26, 29 (1967).
23. Gordon, Legal Questions of Successorship, 3 GA. L. REV. 280, 284 (1969).
See Goldberg, The Labor Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV.
735, 793-806 (1969). "The critical factor is majority employment and an employer
who satisfies this test will be found a successor regardless of the absence of any
of these other factors." Id. at 805.
24. 406 U.S. at 300 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
25. Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding
of successorship upheld on facts essentially similar to those in Burns); Makela
Welding, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1967) (authorization card majority);
NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962) (totally independent successor)
NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960) (transfer between
relatives).
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predecessor's unfair labor practices, 26 and arbitrate grievances arising
under the terms of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
2 7
Also aiding a union seeking to maintain its status as bargaining
agent despite a transfer of ownership is the "almost conclusive presump-
tion" 28 of continued majority representation embodied in the certification
bar rule which provides that, after the Board has certified the winner of
a represehtation election:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any sub-
division within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held. 29
This rule has been interpreted to require that an employer bargain with
a particular union for a period of one year"0 after certification.3 ' While
the existence of "unusual circumstances" '3 2 involving a "change in con-
ditions" will vitiate this duty, "a mere change of employers or of owner-
ship in the employing industry"83 is not sufficient because:
There is no reason to believe that the employees will change their
attitude [toward union representation] merely because the identity
of their employer has changed. 4
Thus, unless an acquiring employer can establish that unusual circum-
stances exist, he will be required to bargain with an incumbent union.
26. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). See
Gordon, supra note 23, at 292-308; notes 93-96 and accompanying text infra.
27. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
28. 406 U.S. at 279 n.3.
29. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
30. In Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), the Board ruled
that, even after the expiration of the one year period, the bargaining relationship
would still be protected by a rebuttable presumption of majority representation.
This principle was later applied to the business transfer problem:
Where . . . the Board's certification of an incumbent union has been
in existence for one year when a successor employer acquires the business,
the union's majority status is presumed . . . unless a doubt as to the union's
majority is raised in good faith and on reasonable grounds.
NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1964) (citations
omitted).
31. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Rockwell Valves, 115 N.L.R.B.
236 (1956); WTOP, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1955); Shirlington Supermarket,
108 N.L.R.B. 579 (1954).
The absence of a certification does not mean that a successor has no duty
to bargain. In Makela Welding, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1967),
the Sixth Circuit enforced a Board order to bargain against a successor despite the
fact that "the union was never certified following a Board election," but instead
was designated bargaining representative on the basis of an authorization card
majority. The court concluded that "[o]n the facts we do not find that the absence
of an election is sufficient reason to excuse [the successor] from the obligation to
bargain with the union." Id. at 46.
32. Such circumstances have been found in three situations:
(1) the certified union dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a schism,
substantially all the members and officers of the certified union transferred their
affiliation to a new local or international; (3) the size of the bargaining unit
fluctuated radically within a short time.
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954).
33. 406 U.S. at 279.
34. NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 1952).
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The Board in Burns founded its decision upon the theoretical con-
siderations which have facilitated the development and expansion of the
successor theory since its inception. This attempt to ameliorate the tension
between contract law and the desire for labor peace was evidenced as
early as 1939 in NLRB v. Colten.3 5 In that case, the Board sought
enforcement of a remedial order against a successor. The successor
argued that, even if the employing industry remained substantially the
same, the employment relationship is contractual in nature and, therefore,
any liability on the part of the predecessor co-partnership was terminated
with the death of one of the partners. Accepting this argument as cor-
rect,3 6 the Sixth Circuit, nevertheless, enforced the Board's order, reason-
ing that an "unimportant" change in the business entity must not be allowed
to subvert the congressional interest in "industrial amity and ... peace."37
The Supreme Court applied the same rationale in John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston,38 a suit pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act,3 9 and required the employer to arbitrate grievances
arising under the terms of a predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment - Wiley had merged with the predecessor employer, Interscience.
Placing strong reliance on the national policy of maintaining peaceful
labor relations, 40 which is the foundation of not only the successor doc-
trine but also the judicial posture favoring arbitration, 41 the Wiley
Court utilized what Justice Rehnquist later termed "a form of the 'suc-
cessor' doctrine" 42 to compel arbitration. In language paralleling that
employed by the Sixth Circuit in Colten, the Court concluded:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not
bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party,
a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract ....
Therefore . . . the impressive policy considerations favoring arbitra-
tion are not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley did not sign
the contract being construed. 43
35. 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
36. Id. at 182.
37. Id. at 183.
38. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
39. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme
Court held arbitration agreements to be specifically enforceable under section 301 (a) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), which provides
in part:(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing the employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
40. Labor-Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
41. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steekworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
42. 406 U.S. at 299.
43. 376 U.S. at 550.
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In light of the Court's decision in Burns, however, other language
in Wiley takes on a greater significance. In urging the Wiley Court to
order arbitration, the union contended that such a result was compelled
by the corporation laws of New York,44 the state in which Wiley was
located. In the alternative, the union argued that the national policy
favoring arbitration would be seriously eroded if a successor were not
required to comply with its predecessor's agreement to arbitrate.4r, Direct-
ing itself to this issue, the Court stated that the law to be applied was
federal and was derived "from the policy of our national labor laws" 46
and from state law to the extent that it was an aid in developing such a
national labor law. 47 Even though the remainder of the opinion placed
great emphasis on the decision's policy considerations, this particular
language left uncertain whether Wiley resolved the successor issue on
the basis of the generally accepted rule dealing with mergers and survival
of claims or whether the decision was derived solely from the broad
policy consideration of fostering labor stability. Although such a distinc-
tion may appear, at first glance, to be little more than academic, the
practical problems were reflected in the differing interpretations given to
Wiley by several of the circuit courts and by the view taken by the
Supreme Court in Burns.
The impact of Wiley was first felt in Wackenhut Corp. v. United
Plant Guard Workers" and in United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal,
Inc.,4 both of which were pending at the time the Supreme Court decided
Wiley. These cases clearly demonstrated that the policy of labor stability
was deemed to be the controlling factor in the Wiley Court's ordering
arbitration. Like Wiley, both Wackenhut 0 and Reliance5' involved the
question of a successor's duty to arbitrate, but, unlike Wiley, the transfers
involved sales of assets rather than a merger. If the narrow reading of
Wiley were presumed correct, the general corporation law upon which it
rested would compel a different result in situations in which the transfer
44. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 906(b) (3) (McKinney 1963), provides in part:
The surviving or consolidated orporation shall assume and be liable for all the
liabilities, obligations and penalties of each of the constituent corporations. No
liability or obligation due or to become due, claim or demand for existing
against any such corporation . . . shall be released . . . by such merger or
consolidation.
This section replaced N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1951) which was
in force at the time of the decision in Wiley. The recodification, however, was
substantially similar to the earlier statute.
45. 376 U.S. at 547-48.
46. Id. at 548.
47. Id.
48. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
49. 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
50. 332 F.2d at 954 (union sought specific performance of agreement to
arbitrate).
51. 335 F.2d at 893 (union sought a declaratory judgment that a successor was
obligated to assume its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement).
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occurred other than by merger.52 Although cognizant of the fact that
certain language in the Wiley opinion could be construed as limiting that
case to mergers, both tribunals rejected this argument. The Ninth Circuit
observed in Wackenhut:
[W]e are convinced that the Supreme Court did not rest the decision
in Wiley on that narrow ground, but upon a broader view dictated
by the policy of the national labor laws. 53
The courts differed, however, on whether the Wiley policy was broad
enough to justify compelling a successor to adopt in toto its predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement. While the Sixth Circuit was of the
opinion that the agreement negotiated between the incumbent union and
the transferor-employer "remained the basic charter of labor relations ...
after the change in ownership,"5 4 the court specifically refused to direct
the successor to honor its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.55
In Wackenhut, the Ninth Circuit arrived at an opposite result. Relying
on "the policy of the national labor laws" as explicated in Wiley, the
court held that Wackenhut was a successor and thus obligated "to honor
the collective bargaining agreement entered into by its predecessor."'5 6
While some commentators have differed with respect to the scope of the
Ninth Circuit's decision,57 at least two federal appellate tribunals have
read the Ninth Circuit's language literally. In Reliance, the Sixth Circuit
opined that Wackenhut makes "a pre-existing labor contract unqualifiedly
binding upon [a successor]." s The Fifth Circuit, citing Wackenhut,
reached a similar conclusion. 59
The Fifth Circuit also interpreted Wiley in United States Gypsum
Co. v. United Steelworkers.60  The Gypsum court determined that an
arbitrable issue was presented when the alleged rights flowed from a
predecessor's contract but the grievance arose after the successor's acquisi-
tion. The court rejected the argument advanced by the successor that the
52. See, e.g., 15 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. ed. 1961),
which provides:
Generally where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets
to another corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities
of the tranferor, except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees
to assume such debts; (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the corporation; (3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is entered
into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.
53. 332 F.2d at 958.
54. 335 F.2d at 895.
55. Id.
56. 332 F.2d at 958.
57. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 23, at 775. But see Gordon, supra note 23,
at 282; Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business,
19 LAB. L.J. 160, 166 (1968) ; Note, The Contractual Obligations of a Successor
Employer under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 914, 927 (1965).
58. 335 F.2d at 895 n.3.
59. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. 384 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1967).
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"vested rights" aspect of Wiley would permit an arbitration order only
if the grievances matured before the business transfer.61
While individually the holdings of these cases have undoubtedly
raised more questions than they have answered, their cumulative effect
upon the interpretation of Wiley reveals a clear trend emphasizing a
broad policy of labor stability. Wackenhut, Reliance, and Gypsum,
either directly or by implication, imposed certain contractual duties of a
predecessor upon a successor who acquired a business in circumstances
where corporation law would not compel that result.62 The demise of
the "vested rights" approach came in Gypsum,63 wherein the court de-
emphasized all but the national labor policy argument and thus extended
Wiley to such a degree that the Board's decision in Burns was the only
logical result.6 4 As one commentator summarized the situation, Wiley
"not only paved the road for the Board's Burns decision, but escorted the
Board most of the way down it."'65
Consequently, the Burns Court was faced with the difficult question
raised but not answered in Wiley - the extent of the application of the
successor theory to post-transfer situations. Two issues had to be decided:
first, was Burns required as a matter of law to recognize and bargain
with the UPG; and second, if Burns were classified as a successor, would
the resulting imposition of duties include an obligation to honor the
collective bargaining agreement of its predecessor.
The most difficult aspect of the first issue focused upon the factors
upon which a bargaining order might be predicated. The Board's bar-
gaining order had rested "entirely on the successorship doctrine." 66 The
Court, however, was not disposed to venture so far. While Burns had
hired a majority of Wackenhut's employees and had performed the same
basic operations as its predecessor, "there was no merger, no sale of
assets, no dealings whatsoever" 67 between the two employers. As the
minority correctly observed, prior to Burns, only one court would have
upheld a finding of successorship in such circumstances. 68 The Court
itself "studiously avoided" 69 denominating Burns a successor and yet
determined that Burns did have an obligation to bargain with the in-
cumbent union. 70 The rationale for this aspect of the Burns decision
was not found in the successorship doctrine, but rather in the certification
bar rule.71 Thus, the Court examined the narrow question of whether
61. Id. at 44.
62. See note 44 supra.
63. 384 F.2d at 44-45.
64. Stern, Binding the Successor Employer to Its Predecessor's Collective
Bargaining Agreement Under the NLRA, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 38 (1971).
65. Doppelt, supra note 18, at 191.
66. 406 U.S. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Id. at 286.
68. Id. at 306 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). See Tom-A-Hawk
Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969).
69. Id. at 296.
70. Id. at 278.
71. Id. at 278-79. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
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or not Burns came within one of the exceptions to this rule. Noting that
"a mere change of employers or of ownership in the employing industry
is not such an 'unusual circumstance' "72 as to relieve an employer of
the duty to bargain, the Court concluded that "Burns could not reason-
ably have entertained a good faith doubt" 75 of the UPG's majority status.
The majority relied heavily on the fact that there was a recent certifica-
tion, that Burns had hired a majority of the former Wackenhut employees
"for work in an identical unit, '74 and that Burns was aware of both the
certification and the new collective bargaining agreement.75 Since Burns
was unable to establish that it fell within the "unusual circumtances"
exception, the Court upheld the Board's bargaining order.76
Although a definitive statement on the subject of successorship was
thus lacking, as indicated by the Court's reliance on the continuity factors,
the determination of Burns' responsibility to bargain represents a limited
expansion of the successor doctrine to include an acquiring employer
having "no dealings whatsoever" 77 with its predecessor. The theoretical
justification for this expansion was the almost unassailable presumption 78
of majority representation which is associated with the certification bar
rule. Since this aspect of the decision rests upon the fact of certification,
and thus upon an artificial presumption of majority representation, a
bargaining order probably would not be sustained where the incumbent
union is not protected by such a presumption, 79 or does not, in fact,
represent a majority of the employees. Such a conclusion is strengthened
further by the fact that the Burns Court refused to require Burns to
honor the collective bargaining agreement previously negotiated between
UPG and Wackenhut. Therefore, it would appear that the successor
doctrine was extended for the narrow purpose of determining Burns'
duty to recognize and bargain with the incumbent union.
In resolving the second issue, the Court employed a more stringent
standard for determining successorship. When faced with a situation
other than the duty to bargain, continued viability of the bargaining unit,
of itself, was insufficient to justify further liability. Adopting the rea-
soning employed by most lower courts,80 the Supreme Court suggested
that post-transfer continuity in the form of an accession to assets on the
part of the employing entity was also a necessary prerequisite to the
72. 406 U.S. at 279.
73. Id. at 278.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 281.
77. Id. at 286.
78. Id. at 279 n.3.
79. But cf. note 30 supra.
80. 406 U.S. at 306 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). See note 25
supra.
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imposition of other duties."' Emphasizing the absence of a transfer of
assets between the two employers,8 2 the Court concluded that, while the
facts were such as to warrant the imposition of a duty to bargain,
they formed:
[A] wholly insufficient basis for implying either in fact or in law
that Burns had agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor
Wackenhut's collective bargaining contract.8 3
More revealing than this conclusion, however, are the developments which
preceded and prompted it.
Those cases discussed previously which required a successor, to a
greater or lesser degree, to abide by the terms of its predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement rested on the policy argument advanced in
Wiley. Yet, the question of whether an acquiring employer having only
minimal contacts with the transferor of the business could be required to
arbitrate under the terms of its predecessor's agreement was specifically
left unanswered by the Wiley Court.8 4 That Court was of the opinion
that an affirmative response would impose completely foreign conditions
upon the new bargaining relationship. 85 This conclusion reflects a long
standing belief that governmental interference in the collective bargaining
process is objectionable.
Reacting to what it viewed as the Board's attempt "to control more
and more the terms of collective bargaining agreements,"86 Congress
enacted legislation which specifically provided that the requirement to
bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession. 8 7 Tested before the Supreme
Court in H.K. Porter, this provision was interpreted to mean that:
[The Board] is without power to compel a company or a union to
agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.88
On the facts, the acquiring employer in Burns would seemingly fall with-
in this exception to Wiley, and in so doing, would clearly fall as well within
the purview of the free collective bargaining policy of H.K. Porter.
Rather than base its conclusion upon the policy argument developed
in Wiley and explicated in H.K. Porter, the Court adopted a second
approach to the post-transfer vitality of a predecessor's collective bar-
gaining agreement. Wiley did not control the result in Burns, not
81. 406 U.S. at 286-87. The minority opinion made the same point. "[C]ontinuity
[must] be at least in part on the employer's side of the equation, rather than only
on that of the employees." Id. at 306 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
82. Id. at 286.
83. Id. at 287.
84. 376 U.S. at 551.
85. Id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1920 (1947).
87. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
88. 397 U.S. at 102.
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because the 1964 decision was never meant to cover such an employer
but because it, unlike Burns:
[A]rose in the context of a § 301 suit to compel arbitration ....
[The Court] held only that the agreement to arbitrate . . . survived
the merger ....
[.. Such merger occurred] against a background of state law
which embodied the general rule that in merger situations the sur-
viving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing
corporation.8 9
This constricted reading of Wiley clearly amounts to a frontal attack
upon that decision's policy basis. Choosing such an approach when the
more limited rationale discussed previously would have served equally
well suggests that the majority was looking beyond the precise question
before it toward more substantial modifications of the successor doctrine.
Implicit in this narrow reading of the Wiley decision is the suggestion
that the Court wished to move toward elimination of those aspects of
the successor theory grounded upon the policy arguments advanced by
the Wiley Court.
The main effects to be anticipated as a result of this change in
emphasis relate primarily to the duties which may be properly imposed
on a successor. Aside from the limited extension in Burns, there would
be little cause to anticipate changes in the bargaining requirement im-
posed on successors since this duty existed independent of Wiley.9 0 The
same would not necessarily hold true of the duty to remedy a predecessor's
unfair labor practices and the requirement of arbitrating grievances under
the terms of a former employer's collective bargaining agreement.91
Other than in situations where the successor was merely the prede-
cessor in a slightly different guise,92 the duty to remedy unfair labor prac-
tices of a predecessor has enjoyed what at best might be termed a rather
precarious existence.93 The major obstacle to its general acceptance was
the absence of a sufficient nexus between the two employers to justify
compelling the successor to remedy the wrongs of the predecessor.9 4 It
was this same problem which induced the Court's refusal to require
Burns to adhere to Wackenhut's contract. The most recent Board
approach to remedying a predecessor's unfair labor practices, as enforced
by the Fifth Circuit, read Wiley as being broad enough to justify requir-
ing a successor to honor a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.95
89. 406 U.S. at 285-86.
90. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra. See also NLRB v. McFarland,306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303(5th Cir. 1960).
91. See note 26 supra.
92. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
93. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 546-48 (5th Cir. 1968).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 547.
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Since this reading of Wiley was specifically rejected in Burns, any con-
tinued adherence to this approach is uncertain.
The difficulties confronting the requirement to arbitrate stem from
two sources. The first of these is that the Court possibly has limited
Wiley to its facts.9 6 Second, even if this were not the case, those courts
reading Wiley as imposing substantive contract terms in fact, if not in
law,9 7 may well be reluctant, in light of Burns, to order arbitration in
post-transfer situations.
One issue remains - should a successor having sufficient contacts
with a predecessor be required to assume the latter's collective bargaining
agreement? The majority gave some indication of the direction in which
the Court would go if this question were squarely presented:
[AIllowing the Board to compel agreement . ..would violate the
fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining
under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract .... Strife is
bound to occur if the concessions which must be honored do not
correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.98
It would appear from its reliance on the policy of free collective bar-
gaining of section 8(d) of the NLRA that the Court would be reluctant
to require an unconsenting successor to assume a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by a predecessor.
As Judge Leventhal observed in his concurring opinion in Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 99 successorship has always
been "shrouded in somewhat impressionist approaches." 100 While the
accuracy of this observation will continue undiminished in the wake of
Burns, some conclusions may be drawn with respect to the current status
of the law. In general, the Court recognized that the duty to bargain
is a requirement separate and distinct from others which might be im-
posed upon a successor.1 0l While post-transfer continuity in the bar-
gaining unit alone is sufficient to give rise to the duty to bargain, other
requirements should be properly imposed only where there exists both
an essential similarity in the bargaining unit and a sufficient nexus between
the predecessor and successor to justify requiring the latter to honor
the obligations of the former. Even though its usefulness may be limited,
the duty to arbitrate undoubtedly survives, but the same cannot be said
96. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 56 & 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
98. 406 U.S. at 287, citing H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)
(emphasis added).
99. 414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 889 (1969).
100. Id.
101. This argument was advanced and rejected in U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 43 (4th Cir. 1967).
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of the duty to remedy a predecessor's unfair labor practices in which the
successor has not participated. 10
2
Due to the fact that the Court's decision was, in some respects, an
extremely narrow one, it provided little in the way of positive guidelines,
and therefore, the Board could continue to utilize the successor doctrine
as it did prior to this decision. This approach, however, would run
against the spirit of the Burns decision. An alternative available to the
Board, and one which would be in keeping with the Burns mandate, is
to require an acquiring employer to bargain with an incumbent union
once an agreement in principle is reached for the transfer. Of course,
this procedure might encounter difficulty with the policy of free collective
bargaining stressed in Burns. However, according to the Court, Burns
did not become an employer having obligations with regard to the UPG
until it had hired a majority of Wackenhut's employees, 03 and prior
to that time, Burns could not have bargained with the UPG without
violating section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA by dealing with a union other
than the one representing a majority of its employees. 10 4 Therefore, con-
gressional action would appear to be required before this approach could
be adopted.
Other possible approaches include requiring an employer to bargain
with the union about transferring its business in a manner similar to the
duty imposed in the contracting-out situation, 0 5 and requiring a successor
to hire its predecessor's employees. 10
102. See text accompanying notes 92-96 supra. Where the successor has par-
ticipated in the unfair labor practices, the acquiring employer is subject to Board
remedial orders. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945).
103. 406 U.S. at 295.
104. As the Second Circuit observed:[Tlhe duty to bargain with the employees' agent under section 8(a) (5) imposes
"the negative duty to treat with no other."
McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 988 (1966) (footnote omitted).
105. See, e.q., Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
106. The Burns Court observed that:
The Board has never held that the National Labor Relations Act itself
requires that an employer who submits the winning bid for a service contract
or who purchases the assets of a business be obligated to hire all of the
employees of the predecessor ....
406 U.S. at 280 n.5. But cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)("employee" to be construed broadly) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944) ("employee" to be construed broadly).
[Wihere . . . the only substantial change wrought by the sale of a business
enterprise is the transfer of ownership, the individuals employed by the seller
of the enterprise must be regarded as "employees" of the purchaser as that
term is used in the Act.
Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1078 (1965).
This reasoning was not applicable to the situation in Burns. The majority
recognized that:
[T]here will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer
plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate
to have him initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before
he fixes terms.
406 U.S. at 294-95. Where this is not the case, the Court's language suggests a
contrary conclusion. Id. at 280.
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The reaction of employers to Burns will probably be mixed. Had
the Burns Court upheld the Board and required Burns to assume Wacken-
hut's collective bargaining agreement the mere existence of this agree-
ment 10 7 would have jeopardized the employer's freedom to choose its
own work force 08 and the availability to the employer of the good faith
defense to a refusal to bargain charge arising from an alleged contra-
vention of the certification bar rule. 10 9 In addition to preserving these
interests, Burns has seemingly limited the requirements which can be
imposed upon a successor under the aegis of labor peace. Although the
duty to bargain with an incumbent union exists as long as there is con-
tinuity in the bargaining unit, even the imposition of this duty remains
improper in at least three situations: where the successor hires none of
its predecessor's employees ;110 where the acquiring employer is able to
establish that it falls within one of the exceptions to the certification
bar rules ;11 and where the unit is deemed an accretion. Specifically
recognized as an exception by the Burns Court," 2 an accretion occurs
when a unionized 13 successor takes over a second business and hires only
a distinct minority of the predecessor's unionized employees.
This latter exception, recognizes that imposing a duty to negotiate
could place a court in the unpalatable position of ordering an employer
to violate section 8(a) (5) by dealing with a minority union. Although
this exception also raises the possibility that, through selective hiring, an
employer could create its own accretion, take advantage of the avail-
ability of a trained work force, and still avoid all obligations with respect
to an incumbent union, an employer attempting to utilize this approach
might be subject to a section 8(a) (3) violation for interfering with one
union and a section 8(a) (2) violation for improperly assisting the other." 4
Similar to management's response, the union reaction to Burns must
also be mixed. While the survival of the bargaining unit is assured in
situations where the opposite result might previously have been the case,
107. Under what is termed the contract bar rule, a collective bargaining agree-
ment operates as a bar to a representation election for a "reasonable time," currently
three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
108. Once a successor is required to adopt its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement in toto.
It would seemingly follow that employees of the predecessor would be deemed
employees of the successor, dischargeable only in accordance with the provisions
of the contract ....
406 U.S. at 288. Cf. note 106 supra.
109. 406 U.S. at 290. See Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 116 (1970),
order enforced, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 406 U.S. 940
(1972).
110. See note 106 supra.
111. See note 32 supra.
112. 406 U.S. at 279 n.3.
113. Where the successor is not unionized, it must deal with the incumbent
union even if only a minority of employees were hired. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 n.5 (1964). See also McGuire v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 1966).
114. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3), 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§
185(a) (3), 185(a) (2) (1970).
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